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Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?: Censorship of Hate 




From Charlottesville to college campuses, people with odious views 
have been very much in the news over the past year. Responses to those people 
and the groups to which they belong have ranged from efforts to keep them 
from speaking in person,1 to deleting their presence on the internet,2 to efforts 
to have them terminated from their jobs3 or evicted from their apartments,4 and 
even to physical assault by members of such groups as Antifa.5 Such efforts at 
censoring, ostracizing, and stigmatizing hate group members are generally jus-
tified by claims that such individuals are dangerous.6 
It is true that some scholars have found an association between the ex-
istence of far-right hate groups and the occurrence of far-right ideological vio-
lence;7 however, it is also true others have failed to find an association between 
hate groups and hate crimes,8 and that the majority of hate crimes are commit-
ted not by ideologically-motivated individuals, but rather by groups of bored 
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youths9 who are often under the influence of alcohol.10 Most importantly, there 
is substantial evidence that censorship and demonization of hate group mem-
bers is counterproductive because they tend to lead to more violence, not less. 
To understand why that is the case, it is essential to take a step back 
and consider why individuals engage in political violence in the first place. Is it 
because they are content, feel respected, and feel that they are treated fairly by 
government and society? Clearly not. Rather, individuals engage in political 
violence only when they have grievances.11 That does not mean that they have 
been treated in an objectively onerous or unfair manner. Rather, individuals are 
“aggrieved” in a way which is likely to drive them to political violence when 
they have been treated in a manner which they consider unjust: 
 
Grievances are not merely expressions of deprivation and dis-
satisfaction. People can be deprived, disappointed, frustrated, 
or dissatisfied without feeling that they have been unjustly or 
unfairly treated -- their unsatisfactory outcome may be “just 
the way things are” or the result of divine judgment, or a con-
sequence of personal ineptitude. In contrast, a real grievance, 
regarded as the basis for complaint or redress, rests upon the 
claim that an injustice has been inflicted upon undeserving 
victims. Grievances are normative protests, claiming viola-
tions of rights or rules.12 
 
The key concept here is that individuals are likely to feel aggrieved if 
they believe that rights or rules have been violated and, hence, that they have 
been treated unjustly. Indeed, as a recently published book points out, almost 
all violence is morally motivated in the sense that it is seen by the perpetrator 
as being morally permissible or even mandatory.13 That is often the case even 
with hate crimes.14 
Thus, because grievances are based on perceived violations of rights 
and rules and because violence is morally motivated, the circumstances that 
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prompt violence will vary from society to society since no two societies have 
identical ideas about morality, about the rules that govern society, or about the 
rights which inhere to members of society. For example, in thirteenth century 
France, a miller’s daughter would not be aggrieved were she told that she could 
never be ruler because such a statement would be consistent with the rules of 
that society. In the contemporary United States, by contrast, children are taught 
from an early age that “anyone can grow up to be president.” As a result, a per-
son who is barred from running for president due to his or her class of birth 
would most certainly feel aggrieved because that bar would violate a common-
ly accepted “right or rule.” 
Therefore, there is no objective test for political grievance. History is 
full of people and groups who seem objectively oppressed but consider their 
circumstances to be legitimate. As a recent doctoral dissertation from the Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science notes, “in order for people to 
take action to address inequalities, the first step is to recognize them and to 
consider them unjust.”15 Indeed, all societies are unequal in some way. Every 
society tells those at the bottom of the hierarchy that their circumstances are 
just and, hence, that political violence is unnecessary or wrongful. Often that 
claim is buttressed by religious beliefs: Hinduism justifies the caste system; 
Buddhism tells its adherents that the solution to misery is not to attempt to sup-
plant those who have more material goods, but rather to give up the desire for 
those goods; and Christianity classically taught that justice for the oppressed is 
not to be achieved by violence in this world, but rather will be delivered in the 
next, for “the meek . . . shall inherit the Earth,”16 and “it is easier for a camel to 
go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of 
God.”17 Even slavery is sometimes deemed morally acceptable by those en-
slaved.18 
So, if members of hate groups are barred from expressing their views, 
are they likely to feel that a “right or rule” has been violated? It certainly seems 
so. The ideals of free speech, civil liberties, and cultural and political egalitari-
anism are central to what social scientists call the “American Creed,” which 
Anatol Lieven described as “integral to American nationalism.”19 In other 
words, respect for free speech defines what it means to be a member of the 
American nation (i.e., an “American”). 
Thus, the idea that every American has the right to speak her or his 
mind—a right which is protected to a greater extent in the United States than in 
                                                        
15  Elise Must, When and How Does Inequality Cause Conflict? Group Dynamics, Percep-
tions and Natural Resources 53 (Sept. 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with 
The London School of Economics and Political Science), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3438/.  
16  Matthew 5:5. 
17  Matthew 19:24. 
18  Elinor Burkett, God Created Me to be a Slave, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 12, 1997, at 56. 
19  ANATOL LIEVEN, AMERICA RIGHT OR WRONG: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM 
49 (2005). 
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any other country on Earth20—is clearly one of the basic rules of American so-
ciety. If that rule is violated by silencing “hate group” members—even though 
the silencing is done with good motives—then by definition those individuals 
will feel aggrieved. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that even convict-
ed sex offenders have a right to access the internet,21 so “hate group” members 
who are told that they are so loathsome that their views are not welcome on the 
internet are likely to see their treatment as unjust—even if objective observers 
can distinguish between sex offenders and “hate group” members. Hence, it 
should be expected that silencing and stigmatizing hate group members will 
create grievances and thereby make violence more likely. 
            Indeed, there is substantial scholarship which indicates that censorship 
or stigmatization of extremist groups and their members tends to drive them to 
employ violence. For example, a recent study by a professor at the University 
of Oslo’s Center for Research on Extremism examined differences in the level 
of right-wing terrorist violence in eighteen western European countries between 
1990 and 2015.22 It found that one “recipe” for increased right-wing violence 
was elites responding to right-wing extremism by repressing and stigmatizing 
extremist groups and opinions.23 That finding is consistent with what scholars 
of political violence have long known: 
 
[I]f groups are excluded, or feel themselves to be excluded, 
from democratic channels of participation, then violent action 
may be seen as the most rational means of political action 
open to them . . . . Political violence is thus fostered by the ex-
clusion or marginalization [sic] of groups from the established 
channels of democratic politics.”24  
 
To put it another way, “[w]hen normal channels of access to the political sys-
tem are blocked, extreme forms of political violence are perceived as neces-
sary[.]25 
Thus, censoring and otherwise stigmatizing members of hate groups 
increases the risk of violence by causing members to feel that they have been 
treated unjustly. However, that is not the only way that such strategies are often 
counterproductive. Censorship and other stigmatization of hate groups and their 
members also tends to make them increasingly extreme, which means that they 
                                                        
20  Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff, ed., 2009). 
21  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
22 Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Explaining Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Eu-
rope: Grievances, Opportunities and Polarisation, 57 EUR. J. POL. RES. 845, 846 (2018), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.12254/full. 
23   Id. 
24  JOHN SCHWARZMANTEL, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 31 (2011). 
25  Donatella Della Porta, On Violence and Repression: A Relational Approach, 49 GOV’T & 
OPPOSITION 159, 160 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2013.47. 
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are increasingly willing to use violence. There are several ways that those strat-
egies tend to radicalize hate groups and their members. 
First, it is commonly understood by social psychologists that repres-
sion and ostracism of groups leads members to identify more strongly with 
those groups.26 A study of members of three extremist right-wing parties in Ita-
ly found that physical or verbal assaults on young persons because of their 
right-wing political views “favoured the development of interviewees’ image of 
themselves as extreme right-wing activists.”27 Similarly, in Europe, censorship 
and verbal delegitimization of those deemed radical Muslims have made radical 
groups more attractive to Muslims who feel alienated from society.28 
Second, censorship and ostracism of members of extremist parties 
tends to drive out relative moderates, leaving only the most extreme members, 
who are more likely to use violence.29 That is true both of extremist groups on 
the left, as in Italy in the 1960s and early 1970s30, and of extremist groups on 
the right, as is demonstrated by a study of ten anti-immigrant parties in Europe 
that found parties that were ostracized continued to be extremist, while parties 
which were not ostracized became more moderate.31 Moreover, since men are 
less deterred by the social stigma against the radical right than are women,32 
and since men are more willing to engage in violence than are women, ostra-
cism is likely to leave extremist groups largely in the hands of men (i.e., those 
most likely to support the use of violence). 
Third, censorship and ostracism of extremists plays into the hands of 
the leaders of extremist parties who use the threat as a means of increasing sol-
idarity33 and a sense of victimization among rank-and-file members, thereby 
                                                        
26  Michael Minkenberg, Repression and Reaction: Militant Democracy and the Radical 
Right in Germany and France, 40 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 25, 43 (2006), 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00313220500482662.  
27  Patrizia Milesi et al., Italy: The Offspring of Fascism, in EXTREME RIGHT ACTIVISTS IN 
EUROPE: THROUGH THE MAGNIFYING GLASS, 67, 77 (Bert Klandermans & Nonna Mayer, 
eds., 2006). 
28  Lasse Lindekilde, Soft Repression and Mobilization: The Case of Transnational Activism 
of Danish Muslims During the Cartoons Controversy, 42 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 451, 454 
(2010), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743810000449. 
29  Della Porta, supra note 25, at 168; accord DAVID ART, INSIDE THE RADICAL RIGHT 48–49 
(2011) (explaining that cordon sanitaire and social sanctions undermine chances of far-right 
political party success, because they drive away relative moderates). 
30  Della Porta, supra note 25 at 160. 
31  Joost Van Spanje &Wouter Van Der Brug, The Party as Pariah: The Exclusion of Anti-
Immigration Parties and Its Effect on Their Ideological Positions, 30 W. EUR. POL. 1022, 
1022 (2007), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402380701617431. 
32  Eelco Harteveld, Daring to Vote Right: Why Men Are More Likely Than Women to Vote 
for the Radical Right (Sept. 23, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, on file with the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam), https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2765246/176416_00_Introduction.pdf. 
33  Minkenberg, supra note 26, at 25.  
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radicalizing formerly more moderate members.34 Thus, it is no surprise that the 
2009 hate speech prosecution of Dutch right-wing politician Geert Wilders in-
creased his support in the subsequent election.35 
Finally, censorship, stigmatization, and ostracism interfere with efforts 
to deradicalize extremists because, in order for deradicalization to be effective, 
it is essential for the individual to be respected, even as his or her opinions and 
behaviors are challenged.36 
It seems quite clear, then, that the most common responses to hate 
group members and other extremists are likely to be counterproductive and 
should be discouraged. A key first step in responding to extremists is to strive 
to treat such individuals, though not their ideas, with respect. After all, these 
people are clearly upset about something. It does not matter why they are upset. 
It does not matter that they are upset because they have bad upbringings and are 
possibly emotionally unstable as a result.37 It does not matter if they are upset 
about the loss of their “white privilege”38 or if they are being manipulated by 
agents of “global capitalism” or other elites.39 Nor is the question whether soci-
ety should accede to their demands because the answer to that is clearly “no.” 
The vow of the protesters at Charlottesville that “Jews will not replace us”40 
obviously should not and will not become the basis of public policy. Rather, the 
question is how should society respond to the expression of those ideas in a 
way which does not exacerbate grievances or increase the risk of violence? 
This challenge was stated succinctly by Jacob Ravndal in his recent 
work.41 As he notes, the challenge constitutes “a demanding balancing act be-
tween upholding core liberal democratic principles such as the freedom of ex-
                                                        
34  Della Porta, supra note 25, at 168.  
35  Joost Van Spanje & Claes De Vreese, The Good, the Bad and the Voter: The Impact of 
Hate Speech Prosecution of a Politician on Electoral Support for His Party, 21 PARTY POL. 
115, 125 (2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354068812472553.  
36  Harald Weilnböck, The Narrative Principle: Good Practice in Anti-Hate Crime Interven-
tions, Within the Radicalisation Awareness Network, in RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN EUROPE 
379, 394 (Ralf Melzer & Sebastian Serafin, eds., 2013), 
https://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzes/248/right_wing_extremism_in_europe.pdf.  
37  Raphael S. Ezekiel, An Ethnographer Looks at Neo-Nazi and Klan Groups: The Racist 
Mind Revisited, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 51(2002), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764202046001005.  
38  Jeff Maskovsky, Toward the Anthropology of White Nationalist Postracialism: Comments 
Inspired by Hall, Goldstein, and Ingram’s “The Hands of Donald Trump”, 7 HAU: J. 
ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 433, 437 (2017), 
https://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau7.1.030.  
39  Tahir Abbas, The Fear and the Passion, TIKKUN (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/the-fear-and-the-passion.  
40  Emma Green, Why the Charlottesville Marchers Were Obsessed With Jews, ATLANTIC, 
Aug. 15, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/nazis-racism-
charlottesville/536928/.  
41  Ravndal, supra note 22. 
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pression and political freedoms for all people, including those on the far right, 
on the one hand, while trying to prevent any form of antidemocratic or violent 
behaviour, on the other.”42 In the words of the political scientist John 
Schwartzmantel, 
 
There are two implications here for the politics of liberal-
democracy: the first is the need for the creation of new institu-
tions which are more inclusive than the present institutions of 
liberal democracy . . . The second implication is that there 
needs to be a change in the discourse of politics—from one 
that is confrontational and dogmatic to one that puts greater 
emphasis on dialogue and communication.43 
 
As much as people fear hate speech, history teaches us two things. 
First, people are far less susceptible to propaganda than is popularly assumed.44 
Second, and most importantly, the ideals of liberal democracy have repeatedly 
won out in the marketplace of ideas. Hence, while putting up with reprehensi-
ble beliefs is deeply unpleasant, the alternative is likely worse. The best—or, 
perhaps, the “least bad”—solution to the problem posed by those who express 
odious opinions is not less respect for civil liberties and democracy, but more. 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the rest of us to be the “adults in the room” by 




                                                        
42  Id. at 18. 
43  SCHWARZMANTEL. supra note 24, at 33–34. 
44  Hugo Mercier, How Gullible Are We? A Review of the Evidence from Psychology and 
Social Science, 21 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 103, 103 (2017), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000111. 
45  Weilnböck, supra note 36, at 394.  
